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Moral Property Rights in Bargaining with Infeasible Claims Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Simon Gächter () (CESifo, and University of St Gallen)
Arno Riedl () (Faculty of Economics and Econometrics, University of Amsterdam)
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In many business transactions, in labor-management relations, in international conflicts, and welfare state reforms bargainers hold strong entitlements that are often generated by claims that are not feasible any more. These entitlements seem to considerably shape negotiation behavior. By using the novel setup of a 'bargaining with claims' experiment we provide new systematic evidence tracking the influence of entitlements and obligations through the whole bargaining process. We find strong entitlement effects that shape opening offers, bargaining duration, concessions and reached (dis-)agreements. We argue that entitlements constitute a 'moral property right' that is influential independent of negotiators' legal property rights.
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Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number
03-055/1.
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Date of creation: 18 Jun 2003Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20030055Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl/
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Keywords: A12 ; D63 ; C78 ; C92. ; Other versions of this item:
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Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
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