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Committee Structure and its Implications for Monetary Policy Decision-making

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Author Info
Jan Marc Berk () (De Nederlandsche Bank, and FEWEB, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
Beata K. Bierut () (Faculty of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam)

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Abstract

We investigate the implications for the setting of interest rates when monetary policy decisions are taken by a committee, in which a subset of members may meet prior to the voting in the committee and therefore has the possibility to reach consensus ex ante to vote unanimously ex post. We allow for different committee sizes, various voting rules and differences in skills among committee members. We find that the size of the committee is much less important in deter- mining the degree of interest rate inertia than the skills of committee members. Moreover, prior interaction of a subgroup only has a minor effect on the setting of interest rates by the committee, provided that members on average are equally skilled and voting takes place using a simple majority rule. If either of those assumptions are relaxed, prior interaction has substantial effects on the setting of interest rates. In addition, prior interaction increases the optimal size of the Committee, ceteris paribus.

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Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 03-053/2.

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Date of creation: 18 Jun 2003
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20030053

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Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl/

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Related research
Keywords: monetary policy; interest rates; voting.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Marvin Goofriend, 1999. "The role of a regional bank in a system of central banks," Working Paper 99-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Alan S. Blinder, 1999. "Central Banking in Theory and Practice," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262522608.
  3. Ben-Yashar, Ruth C & Nitzan, Shmuel I, 1997. "The Optimal Decision Rule for Fixed-Size Committees in Dichotomous Choice Situations: The General Result," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(1), pages 175-86, February.
  4. Gildea, John A, 1992. "The Regional Representation of Federal Reserve Bank Presidents," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 24(2), pages 215-25, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Otto H. Swank & Phongthorn Wrasai, 2002. "Deliberation, Information Aggregation and Collective Decision Making," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 02-006/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  6. Belden, Susan, 1989. "Policy Preferences of FOMC Members as Revealed by Dissenting Votes," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 21(4), pages 432-41, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Ellen E. Meade & D. Nathan Sheets, 2002. "Regional influences on U.S. monetary policy: some implications for Europe," International Finance Discussion Papers 721, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
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  1. Jan Marc Berk & Beata K. Bierut, 2004. "The effects of Learning in Interactive Monetary Policy Committees," MEB Series (discontinued) 2004-01, Netherlands Central Bank, Monetary and Economic Policy Department. [Downloadable!]
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