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Fairness and Reciprocity in the Hawk-Dove Game

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Author Info

  • Tibor Neugebauer

    ()
    (University of Hannover)

  • Anders Poulsen

    ()
    (Aarhus School of Business, Denmark)

  • Arthur J.H.C. Schram

    ()
    (University of Amsterdam)

Abstract

We study fairness and reciprocity in a Hawk-Dove game. This alllows us to testvarious models in one framework. We observe a large extent of selfish and rationalbehavior. Our results are inconsistent with leading models in this field.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 02-094/1.

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Date of creation: 07 Oct 2002
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20020094

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Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl

Related research

Keywords: Hawk-Dove game; reciprocity; fairness.;

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References

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  1. Dufwenberg, M. & Kirchsteiger, G., 1998. "A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity," Discussion Paper 1998-37, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2000. "Social Preferences: Some Simple Tests and a New Model," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1483, Econometric Society.
  3. Brandts, J. & Charness, G., 1998. "Hot Vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 424.98, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  4. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2003. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," General Economics and Teaching 0303002, EconWPA.
  5. Falk, Armin & Fischbacher, Urs, 2001. "A Theory of Reciprocity," CEPR Discussion Papers 3014, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, . "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocitys," IEW - Working Papers 040, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  7. Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2001. "Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity," Discussion Papers in Economics 14, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  8. Glenn W. Harrison & Jack Hirshleifer, 1988. "An Experimental Evaluation of Weakest-Link/Best Shot Models of Public Goods," UCLA Economics Working Papers 473, UCLA Department of Economics.
  9. Axel Ockenfels & Gary E. Bolton, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. repec:hal:cesptp:hal-00796708 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Schram, Arthur & Brandts, Jordi & Gërxhani, Klarita, 2010. "Information, bilateral negotiations, and worker recruitment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(8), pages 1035-1058, November.
  3. Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Nathalie Etchart-Vincent, 2012. "The puzzle of cooperation in a game of chicken: an experimental study," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(1), pages 65-87, January.
  4. Siegfried Berninghaus & Stephan Schosser & Bodo Vogt, 2013. "Equilibrium Selection under Limited Control - An Experimental Study of the Network Hawk-Dove Game," Jena Economic Research Papers 2013-048, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
  5. Verena Utikal & Urs Fischbacher, 2009. "On the attribution of externalities," TWI Research Paper Series 46, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
  6. Ryan Oprea & Keith Henwood & Daniel Friedman, 2010. "Separating the Hawks from the Doves: Evidence from Continuous Time Laboratory Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 3129, CESifo Group Munich.
  7. Jordi Brandts & Arthur Schram & Klarita Gërxhani, 2007. "Information Networks and Worker Recruitment," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 707.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  8. Benedikt Herrmann & Henrik Orzen, 2008. "The appearance of homo rivalis: Social preferences and the nature of rent seeking," Discussion Papers 2008-10, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  9. repec:hal:ciredw:hal-00395939 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00796708 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00741973 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Ott, Marion, 2012. "Forward-looking behavior in Hawk–Dove games in endogenous networks: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 35-52.
  13. repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00395939 is not listed on IDEAS
  14. Holden, Stein & Bezu, Sosina, 2014. "Are Wives less Selfish than their Husbands? Evidence from Hawk-Dove Game Field Experiments," CLTS Working Papers 3/14, Centre for Land Tenure Studies, Norwegian University of Life Sciences.

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