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Credit Ratings as Coordination Mechanisms

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Author Info
Arnoud W.A. Boot () (University of Amsterdam)
Todd T. Milbourn () (Washington University in St Louis)

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Abstract

In this paper, we provide a novel rationale for credit ratings. The rationale that we propose is that credit ratings can serve as a coordinating mechanism in situations where multiple equilibria can obtain. We show that credit ratings provide a "focal point" for firms and their investors. We explore the vital, but previously overlooked implicit contractual relationship between a credit rating agency and a firm. Credit ratings can help fix the desired equilibrium and as such play an economically meaningful role. Our model provides several empirical predictions and insights regarding the expected price impact of ratings changes, the discreteness in funding cost changes, and the effect of the focus of organizations on the efficacy of credit ratings.

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Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 02-058/2.

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Date of creation: 21 Jun 2002
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20020058

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  7. Hand, John R M & Holthausen, Robert W & Leftwich, Richard W, 1992. " The Effect of Bond Rating Agency Announcements on Bond and Stock Prices," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(2), pages 733-52, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Christina E. Bannier & Christian Hirsch, 2008. "The Economics of Rating Watchlists: Evidence from Rating Changes," Working Paper Series: Finance and Accounting 184, Department of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt am Main. [Downloadable!]
  2. Timo Baas & Mechthild Schrooten, 2005. "Relationship Banking and SMEs : A Theoretical Analysis," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 469, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Ari Hyytinen & Mika Pajarinen, 2004. "Opacity of Young Firms: Faith or Fact?," Discussion Papers 923, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. [Downloadable!]
  4. Christina E. Bannier & Marcel Tyrell, 2005. "Modelling the role of credit rating agencies - Do they spark off a virtuous circle?," Working Paper Series: Finance and Accounting 160, Department of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt am Main. [Downloadable!]
  5. Mark A. Carlson & Galina B. Hale, 2005. "Courage to Capital? A Model of the Effects of Rating Agencies on Sovereign Debt Role-over," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1506, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Christina E. Bannier & Falko Fecht & Marcel Tyrell, 2006. "Open-End Real Estate Funds in Germany - Genesis and Crisis," Working Paper Series: Finance and Accounting 165, Department of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt am Main. [Downloadable!]
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