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Sequential Advocacy

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Author Info
Klaas J. Beniers () (Faculty of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam)
Robert A.J. Dur () (Faculty of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam)
Otto H. Swank () (Faculty of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam)

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Abstract

The collection of information necessary for decision-making is often delegated to agents (e.g. bureaucrats, advisors, lawyers). If both the pros and cons of a decision have to be examined, it is better to use competing agents instead of a single agent. The reason is that two conflicting pieces of information cancel each other out. Using two agents, each searching for one cause yields full information collection at minimum costs. This provides a rationale for advocacy in political and judicial systems. In this paper, we provide a rationale for the sequential nature of information collection in advocacy systems. If two agents search simultaneously, the incentive to continue searching is affected by the information found by the other agent. This forces the principal to leave rents to the agents. If agents search sequentially, the reward can be made conditional on the information found in earlier stages. This reduces the cost of information collection. However, sequential advocacy implies either a more sluggish decision-making process or a less-informed decision.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 02-016/1.

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Date of creation: 08 Feb 2002
Date of revision: 10 Jun 2003
Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20020016

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Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl/

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Related research
Keywords: Information collection; advocates; sequential; budgetary process;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

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