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Delegation or Voting

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Author Info

  • Otto H. Swank

    ()
    (Erasmus University Rotterdam)

  • Bauke Visser

    ()
    (Erasmus University Rotterdam)

Abstract

Collective decision procedures should balance the incentives they provide toacquire information and their capacity to aggregate private information. In a decisionproblem in which a project can be accepted or rejected once information about its qualityhas been acquired or not, we compare the performance of a delegation structure with that oftwo voting procedures. Delegation makes one's acceptance decision pivotal by definition.The decisiveness of one's vote in a voting procedure depends on the other agent's vote.This in turn determines the decision to acquire information. In the debate about a rationalchoice foundation of Condorcet's Jury Theorem, the distribution of information was leftexogenous. Mixed (acceptance) strategies were required to validate the Theorem.Endogenizing information acquisition as we do reveals mixed (acceptance) strategies to bedetrimental for welfare as they lead to indifference between buying and not buyinginformation.

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File URL: http://papers.tinbergen.nl/02005.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 02-005/1.

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Date of creation: 22 Jan 2002
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20020005

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Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl

Related research

Keywords: Voting; Jury theorem; Information; Effort;

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  1. Cukierman, A. & Spiegel, Y., 1998. "When do Representative and Direct Democracies Lead to Similar Policy Choices?," Papers 21-98, Tel Aviv.
  2. Piketty, Thomas, 1999. "The information-aggregation approach to political institutions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 791-800, April.
  3. Gilligan, Thomas W & Krehbiel, Keith, 1997. "Specialization Decisions within Committee," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(2), pages 366-86, October.
  4. Wit, Jorgen, 1998. "Rational Choice and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 364-376, February.
  5. Sah, Raaj Kumar & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1988. "Committees, Hierarchies and Polyarchies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(391), pages 451-70, June.
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