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Simple and Complex Gift Exchange in the Laboratory

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Author Info

  • Eline C.M. van der Heijden

    (Tilburg University)

  • Jan H.M. Nelissen

    ()
    (Erasmus University Rotterdam)

  • Jan J.M. Potters

    (Tilburg University)

  • Harrie A.A. Verbon

    (Tilburg University)

Abstract

We examine an experimental gift exchange game in which the players can improve upon theunique no-gifts equilibrium through cooperative gift giving. The main feature of the study is thatthere are two different types of gift exchange, which we call simple and complex exchange,respectively. Complex exchange gives higher payoffs than simple exchange but it requires not onlymutual trust, like simple exchange, but also a substantial degree of coordination. We examinewhether players are able to conclude simple and complex exchanges and how this is affected bythe move and matching structure of the game.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 01-087/3.

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Date of creation: 03 Oct 2001
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20010087

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Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl

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Keywords: experiments; reciprocity; trust; coordination; gift exchange;

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References

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  2. Lensberg, T. & Heijden, E.C.M. van der, 1998. "A cross-cultural study of reciprocity, trust and altruism in a gift exchange experiment," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1998-77, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  3. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory Of Fairness, Competition, And Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868, August.
  4. M. Rabin, 2001. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 511, David K. Levine.
  5. Kranton, Rachel E, 1996. "Reciprocal Exchange: A Self-Sustaining System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 830-51, September.
  6. Fehr, Ernst & Gachter, Simon, 1998. "Reciprocity and economics: The economic implications of Homo Reciprocans1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 845-859, May.
  7. Sugden, Robert, 1984. "Reciprocity: The Supply of Public Goods through Voluntary Contributions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(376), pages 772-87, December.
  8. Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July.
  9. Georg Kirchsteiger & Ernst Fehr & Arno Riedl, 1993. "Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/5927, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  10. Fehr, Ernst, et al, 1998. "When Social Norms Overpower Competition: Gift Exchange in Experimental Labor Markets," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(2), pages 324-51, April.
  11. Andreoni, James, 1988. "Why free ride? : Strategies and learning in public goods experiments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 291-304, December.
  12. Guth, Werner, 1995. "An Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Cooperative Behavior by Reciprocal Incentives," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 323-44.
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Cited by:
  1. Johann Behrens & Hartmut Kliemt & M. Vittoria Levati & Werner Güth, 2006. "Games that Doctors Play Two-layered agency problems in a medical system," Papers on Strategic Interaction, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group 2006-02, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  2. Potters, J.J.M. & Sefton, M. & Vesterlund, L., 2001. "Why Announce Leadership Contributions? An Experimental Study of the Signaling and Reciprocity Hypotheses," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 2001-100, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  3. Pech, Wesley & Milan, Marcelo, 2009. "Behavioral economics and the economics of Keynes," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 38(6), pages 891-902, December.
  4. Potters, J.J.M. & Sefton, M. & Vesterlund, L., 2007. "Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: An experimental study," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-302954, Tilburg University.
  5. Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter J., 2010. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," IZA Discussion Papers 4941, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  6. Eline van der Heijden & Jan H.M. Nelissen & Harrie A.A. Verbon, 2002. "Should the Same Side of the Market Always Move First in a Transaction?. An Experimental Study," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 158(2), pages 344-, June.
  7. Bernd Irlenbusch, 2006. "Experimental perspectives on incentives in organisations," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 1-24, February.
  8. Mak, Vincent & Zwick, Rami, 2009. ""Confidentially yours": Restricting information flow between trustees enhances trust-dependent transactions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 70(1-2), pages 142-154, May.
  9. Simon Gächter & Ernst Fehr, . "Fairness in the Labour Market – A Survey of Experimental Results," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich 114, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  10. Irlenbusch, Bernd & Sliwka, Dirk, 2005. "Transparency and reciprocal behavior in employment relations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 383-403, March.
  11. Irlenbusch, Bernd & Sliwka, Dirk, 2003. "Career Concerns in a Simple Experimental Labour Market," IZA Discussion Papers 855, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  12. Solnick, Sara J., 2007. "Cash and alternate methods of accounting in an experimental game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 316-321, February.
  13. Tamás Kovács & Marc Willinger, 2010. "Is there a relation between trust and trustworthiness?," Working Papers, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier 10-03, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Mar 2010.

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