Simple and Complex Gift Exchange in the Laboratory

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Simple and Complex Gift Exchange in the Laboratory

Author Info

Eline C.M. van der Heijden (Tilburg University)
Jan H.M. Nelissen () (Erasmus University Rotterdam)
Jan J.M. Potters (Tilburg University)
Harrie A.A. Verbon (Tilburg University)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We examine an experimental gift exchange game in which the players can improve upon the unique no-gifts equilibrium through cooperative gift giving. The main feature of the study is that there are two different types of gift exchange, which we call simple and complex exchange, respectively. Complex exchange gives higher payoffs than simple exchange but it requires not only mutual trust, like simple exchange, but also a substantial degree of coordination. We examine whether players are able to conclude simple and complex exchanges and how this is affected by the move and matching structure of the game.

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Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 01-087/3.

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Date of creation: 03 Oct 2001
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20010087

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Article
- van der Heijden, Eline C M, et al, 2001. "Simple and Complex Gift Exchange in the Laboratory," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 39(2), pages 280-97, April.
Paper
- Heijden, E.C.M. van der & Nelissen, J.H.M. & Potters, J.J.M., 1999. "Simple and complex gift exchange in the laboratory," Discussion Paper 78, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2001-10-16 (All new papers)
NEP-EXP-2001-10-16 (Experimental Economics)
NEP-MIC-2001-10-16 (Microeconomics)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Andreoni, James, 1988. "Why free ride? : Strategies and learning in public goods experiments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 291-304, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Fehr, Ernst & Kirchsteiger, George & Riedl, Arno, 1993. "Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(2), pages 437-59, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kranton, Rachel E, 1996. "Reciprocal Exchange: A Self-Sustaining System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 830-51, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Sugden, Robert, 1984. "Reciprocity: The Supply of Public Goods through Voluntary Contributions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(376), pages 772-87, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Andreoni, James A & Miller, John H, 1993. "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Experimental Evidence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(418), pages 570-85, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," IEW - Working Papers iewwp004, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1998. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers 1812, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory Of Fairness, Competition, And Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Guth, Werner, 1995. "An Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Cooperative Behavior by Reciprocal Incentives," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 323-44.

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Jan Potters & Martin Sefton & Lise Vesterlund, 2007. "Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 169-182, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Eline C.M. van der Heijden & Jan H.M. Nelissen & Harrie A.A. Verbon, 2001. "Should the Same Side of the Market always move first in a Transaction? An Experimental Study," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 01-089/3, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Heijden, E.C.M. van der & Nelissen, J.H.M. & Verbon, H.A.A., 2000. "Should the same side of the market always move first in a transaction? : an experimental study," Discussion Paper 103, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
- Eline van der Heijden & Jan H.M. Nelissen & Harrie A.A. Verbon, 2002. "Should the Same Side of the Market Always Move First in a Transaction?. An Experimental Study," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 158(2), pages 344-, June.
Johann Behrens & Hartmut Kliemt & M. Vittoria Levati & Werner Güth, 2006. "Games that Doctors Play Two-layered agency problems in a medical system," Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-02, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
Irlenbusch, Bernd & Sliwka, Dirk, 2003. "Career Concerns in a Simple Experimental Labour Market," IZA Discussion Papers 855, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Irlenbusch, Bernd & Sliwka, Dirk, 2006. "Career concerns in a simple experimental labour market," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 147-170, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Potters, J. & Sefton, M. & Vesterlund, L., 2001. "Why announce leadership contributions? : An experimental study of the signaling and reciprocity hypotheses," Discussion Paper 100, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]

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