The Impact of Lobbying on the Allocation of Political Authority
AbstractThis paper studies the internal organizational design of politicalinstitutions in presence of lobbying. We consider a legislature ascomposed of two bodies: the floor and an informational committee. Thefloor has the (formal) power to choose the policy to be implemented.The policy outcome is ex ante unknown but the committee has anexpertise to learn the payoff pattern of the feasible policies.In this context, we investigate the impact of lobbying on the optimalallocation of political authority ( agenda control) between the floorand the standing committee.The allocation of the agenda control is here described as the choicebetween two alternative legislative rules: open versus closed rule.We show that, in presence of lobbying, the effectiveness of a closedrule as an incentive device towards the committee is noticeablyreduced while the costs imposed to the floor are higher. As aconsequence, we find that a closed rule is never an optimal choicefor the floor.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 01-084/1.
Date of creation: 12 Sep 2001
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Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl
Lobbying; Procedure Rule; Open/Closed Rule;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2001-10-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2001-10-16 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2001-10-16 (Positive Political Economics)
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