This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Effects of Positions in Knowledge Networks on Trust

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
David J. Dekker () (Erasmus University Rotterdam)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper empirically explores relations between network positions in knowledge networks and trust. In social network theory the closure argument and the gossip argument describe this relation. These two arguments do not distinguish between different dimensions of trust. In this paper we estimate effects of closure positions on two dimensions of trust (trust in abilities and trust in intentions). The closure argument emphasizes that dense network structures enforce individuals to be trustworthy. The gossip argument emphasizes that dense networks amplifies gossip. Since it was found that different network positions are optimal for different tasks, we propose that the content of a network is an intrinsic characteristic of a network that influences whether gossip is neutral or judgmental. To discern between different contents we consider two task-specific knowledge networks. Empirical data were collected on a network of 55 individuals in the setting of account management. These data strongly support the gossip argument for both dimensions of trust. However, the data only gave weak and ambiguous support for the closure argument.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.tinbergen.nl/discussionpapers/01062.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 01-062/1.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 02 Jul 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20010062

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Walther Schoonenberg).

Related research
Keywords: Trust; Knowledge Network Structures; Account Management;

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Gruenfeld, Deborah H & Martorana, Paul V. & Fan, Elliott T., 2000. "What Do Groups Learn from Their Worldliest Members? Direct and Indirect Influence in Dynamic Teams," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 45-59, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? There is a FAQ (frequently asked questions).

This page was last updated on 2009-12-10.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.