The Pre-commitment Advantage of Having a Slow Legislative System
AbstractIn this paper it is argued that the slowness of the legislativesystem implies pre-commitment of legislation for at least the periodit takes to change a law. A simple model illustrates the benefit ofthis pre-commitment.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 01-008/3.
Date of creation: 17 Jan 2001
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time-inconsistency; legislation; irreversible investments;
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