A cooperative game with transferable utilities, or simply a TU-game, describes a situation in which players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation. A solution mapping for these games is a mapping which assigns to every game a set of payoff distributions over the players in the game. Well-known solution mappings are the Core and the Weber set. In this paper we consider the mapping assigning to every game the Harsanyi set being the set of payoff vectors obtained by all possible distributions of the Harsanyi dividends of a coalition amongst its members. We discuss the structure and properties of this mapping and show how the Harsanyi set is related to the Core and Weber set. We also characterize the Harsanyi mapping as the unique mapping satisfying a set of six axioms. Finally we discuss some properties of the Harsanyi Imputation set, being the individally rational subset of the Harsanyi set.
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