Social Status and Group Norms
AbstractThis paper provides experimental evidence showing that indirectreciprocity may important in economic decision making and in thedevelopment of group norms. We study a `repeated helping game' withrandom pairing in large groups, with individuals equally dividedbetween donors and recipients. Donors decide whether to help theindividuals they are matched with against a certain cost or not tohelp, enduring no costs. We observe that many decision makers respondto the information we give them about former decisions of therecipients, even if they realize that this information is based ontransactions with third parties.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 01-003/1.
Date of creation: 17 Jan 2001
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- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
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