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Social Status and Group Norms

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Author Info

  • Ingrid Seinen

    ()

  • Arthur Schram

    ()
    (CREED, University of Amsterdam)

Abstract

This paper provides experimental evidence showing that indirectreciprocity may important in economic decision making and in thedevelopment of group norms. We study a `repeated helping game' withrandom pairing in large groups, with individuals equally dividedbetween donors and recipients. Donors decide whether to help theindividuals they are matched with against a certain cost or not tohelp, enduring no costs. We observe that many decision makers respondto the information we give them about former decisions of therecipients, even if they realize that this information is based ontransactions with third parties.

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File URL: http://papers.tinbergen.nl/01003.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 01-003/1.

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Date of creation: 17 Jan 2001
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20010003

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References

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  1. Georg Kirchsteiger & Ernst Fehr & Arno Riedl, 1993. "Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/5927, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  2. Roth, Alvin E. & Vesna Prasnikar & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara & Shmuel Zamir, 1991. "Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1068-95, December.
  3. David K. Levine, 1998. "Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiment," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 1(3), pages 593-622, July.
  4. M. Rabin, 2001. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 511, David K. Levine.
  5. Fehr, Ernst & Gachter, Simon, 1998. "Reciprocity and economics: The economic implications of Homo Reciprocans1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 845-859, May.
  6. repec:att:wimass:9102 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter & Georg Kirchsteiger, 1997. "Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 833-860, July.
  8. Cooper, R. & DeJong, D.W. & Ross, T.W., 1992. "Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games," Papers 36, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  9. James Andreoni & John H Miller, 1997. "Rational Cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma: experimental evidence," Levine's Working Paper Archive 670, David K. Levine.
  10. Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July.
  11. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
  12. Schram, Arthur, 2000. " Sorting Out the Seeking: The Economics of Individual Motivations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 231-58, June.
  13. McKelvey, Richard D & Palfrey, Thomas R, 1992. "An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(4), pages 803-36, July.
  14. Fehr, Ernst, et al, 1998. "When Social Norms Overpower Competition: Gift Exchange in Experimental Labor Markets," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(2), pages 324-51, April.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Friederike Mengel & Gergely Horváth & Jaromir Kovarik, 2010. "Limited memory can be beneficial for the evolution of cooperation," Working Papers. Serie AD 2010-25, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  2. Engelmann, Dirk & Kübler, Dorothea, 2007. "Do Legal Standards Affect Ethical Concerns of Consumers?," IZA Discussion Papers 3266, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. Rockenbach, Bettina & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim, 2012. "Sharing information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 689-698.
  4. Arthur Schram & Jordi Brandts & Klarita Gërxhani, 2007. "Information Networks and Worker Recruitment," Working Papers 316, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  5. Luca Stanca, 2011. "Social science and neuroscience: how can they inform each other?," International Review of Economics, Springer, vol. 58(3), pages 243-256, September.
  6. Jordi Brandts & Enrique Fatás, 2004. "Endogenous social influence in an experimental dilemma game," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces 2004/59, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
  7. Dirk Engelmann & Urs Fischbacher, 2008. "Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game," TWI Research Paper Series 34, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
  8. Servátka, Maros, 2010. "Does generosity generate generosity? An experimental study of reputation effects in a dictator game," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 11-17, January.
  9. Sven Fischer & Werner Güth, 2011. "Effects of exclusion on social preferences," Jena Economic Research Papers 2011-053, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
  10. Greiner, Ben & Vittoria Levati, M., 2005. "Indirect reciprocity in cyclical networks: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 711-731, October.
  11. Chun Lei Yang & Ching Syang Jack Yue, 2004. "The Rise of Cooperation in Correlated Matching Prisoners Dilemma: An Experiment," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000097, UCLA Department of Economics.
  12. Tobias Regner, 2005. "Why Voluntary Contributions? Google Answers," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 05/115, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
  13. Jim Engle-Warnick & Andreas Leibbrandt, 2006. "Who Gets the Last Word? An Experimental Study of the Effect of a Peer Review Process on the Expression of Social Norms," CIRANO Working Papers 2006s-12, CIRANO.
  14. Chun-Lei Yang & Ching-Syang Jack Yue & I-Tang Yu, 2007. "The rise of cooperation in correlated matching prisoners dilemma: An experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 3-20, March.

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