American Economic Review , 2002, 92(3), 625-43.">
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Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Jacob K. Goeree () (California Institute of Technology)
Theo Offerman () (CREED, University of Amsterdam)
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This discussion has resulted in a publication in the American Economic Review , 2002, 92(3), 625-43.
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Jehiel, Phillipe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1998.
"Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations ,"
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Jason Shachat & J. Todd Swarthout, 2003.
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Quazi Shahriar, 2008.
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Vincent Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2005.
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University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series
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321307000000000256, UCLA Department of Economics.
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"Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions? ,"
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784828000000000604, UCLA Department of Economics.
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"Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions? ,"
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Dakshina De Silva & Timothy Dunne & Anuruddha Kankanamge & Georgia Kosmopoulou, 2005.
"The Impact of Public Information on Bidding in Highway Procurement Auctions ,"
Microeconomics
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De Silva, Dakshina G. & Dunne, Timothy & Kankanamge, Anuruddha & Kosmopoulou, Georgia, 2008.
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