This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ALL-2000-07-27 (All new papers)
• NEP-IND-2000-07-27 (Industrial Organization)
• NEP-PUB-2000-07-27 (Public Finance)

1. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Ossard, Herve & Vuong, Quang, 1995. "Econometrics of First-Price Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(4), pages 953-80, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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   • LAFFONT, Jean-Jacques & OSSARD, Hervé & VUONG, Quang, 1991. "Econometrics of First-Price Auctions," IDEI Working Papers 7, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
3. Graham, Daniel A & Marshall, Robert C, 1987. "Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(6), pages 1217-39, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Paarsch, Harry J., 1992. "Deciding between the common and private value paradigms in empirical models of auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1-2), pages 191-215. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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   • Paarsch, H.J., 1990. "Deciding Between The C Ommon And Private Value Paradigms In Empirical Models Of Auctions," UBC Departmental Archives 90-09, UBC Department of Economics.
5. Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 2000. "Efficient Auctions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(2), pages 341-388, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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   • P. Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 1998. "Efficient Auctions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1857, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
6. Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 2000. "Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 499-525, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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   • Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1996. "Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions," Discussion Papers 1168, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
7. Jeremy Bulow & Ming Huang & Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Toeholds and Takeovers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(3), pages 427-454, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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   • Jeremy Bulow & Ming Huang & Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Toeholds and Takeovers," Finance 9903005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   • Bulow, Jeremy I & Huang, Ming & Klemperer, Paul, 1996. "Toeholds and Takeovers," CEPR Discussion Papers 1486, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Jeremy Bulow & Ming Huang & Paul Klemperer, 1996. "Toeholds and Takeovers," Finance 9608001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
8. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Prices and the Winner's Curse," Game Theory and Information 9904003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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   • Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 2002. "Prices and the Winner's Curse," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(1), pages 1-21, Spring.
9. Jehiel, Phillipe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1999. "Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 99-74, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
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   • Jehiel, Phillipe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1998. "Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 98-22, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
   • Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 1998. "Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations," Discussion Papers 1244, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
   • Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 2001. "Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1237-59, September.
10. Bulow, Jeremy & Klemperer, Paul, 1996. "Auctions versus Negotiations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 180-94, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Klemperer, P., 1999. "Auction Theory: a Guide to the Literature," Economics Papers 1999-w12, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
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    • Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Microeconomics 9903002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    • Klemperer, Paul, 1999. "Auction Theory: a Guide to the Literature," CEPR Discussion Papers 2163, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Klemperer, Paul, 1999. " Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 13(3), pages 227-86, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Caplin, Andrew & Nalebuff, Barry, 1991. "Aggregation and Imperfect Competition: On the Existence of Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 25-59, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    • Andrew Caplin & Barry Nalebuff, 1990. "Aggregation and Imperfect Competition: On the Existence of Equilibrium," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 937, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    • Caplin, A. & Nalebuff, B., 1989. "Aggregation And Imperfect Competition: On The Existence Of Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 1989_30, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
13. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1997. "Game theory and empirical economics: The case of auction data 1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 1-35, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Laffont, J.J., 1996. "Game Theory and Empirical Economics: The Case of Auction Data," Papers 95.394, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
14. Wilson, Robert, 1977. "A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(3), pages 511-18, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Nicola Persico, 2000. "Information Acquisition in Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(1), pages 135-148, January.
    Other versions:
    • Nicola Persico, 1997. "Information Acquisition in Auctions," UCLA Economics Working Papers 762, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
16. Paul R. Milgrom, 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    • Paul R. Milgrom, 1979. "Good Nevs and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Discussion Papers 407R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
17. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1992. "Bidding Rings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 579-99, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John., 1990. "Bidding Rings," Working Papers 726, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
18. Holt, Charles A, Jr, 1980. "Competitive Bidding for Contracts under Alternative Auction Procedures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(3), pages 433-45, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
19. Ashenfelter, Orley, 1989. "How Auctions Work for Wine and Art," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 23-36, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
20. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1029-1058, September.
    Other versions:
    • Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1994. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information," Discussion Papers 1117, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
21. An, Mark Yuying, 1998. "Logconcavity versus Logconvexity: A Complete Characterization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 350-369, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    • An, Mark Yuying, 1995. "Logconcavity versus Logconvexity: A Complete Characterization," Working Papers 95-03, Duke University, Department of Economics.
22. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1981. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Discussion Papers 447R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
23. Bikhchandani, Sushil & Riley, John G., 1991. "Equilibria in open common value auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 101-130, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
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1. Matthias Sutter & Martin Kocher & Sabine Strauß, . "Individuals and teams in UMTS-license auctions," Working Papers 2007-23, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck. [Downloadable!]
2. Vlad Mares & Mikhael Shor, 2003. "Joint Bidding in Common Value Auctions: Theory and Evidence," Game Theory and Information 0305001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
3. Quazi Shahriar, 2008. "Common Value Auctions with Buy Prices," Working Papers 0031, San Diego State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
4. Mikusheva, Anna & Sonin, Konstantin, 2002. "Information Revelation and Efficiency in Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 3675, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Mikoucheva, Anna & Sonin, Konstantin, 2004. "Information revelation and efficiency in auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 277-284, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Ed Hopkins & Tatiana Kornienko, 2004. "Non-Monotone Comparative Statics in Games of Incomplete Information," ESE Discussion Papers 122, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Ed Hopkins & Tatiana Kornienko, 2004. "Non-Monotone Comparative Statics in Games of Incomplete Information," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000662, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
6. De Silva, Dakshina & Kosmopoulou, Georgia & Lamarche, Carlos, 2007. "The Effect of Information on the Bidding and Survival of Entrants in Procurement Auctions," MPRA Paper 5236, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
7. Fangcheng Tang & Weizhou Zhong & Shunfeng Song, 2006. "Tenders with Different Risk Preferences in Construction Industry," Working Papers 06-006, University of Nevada, Reno, Department of Economics & University of Nevada, Reno , Department of Resource Economics. [Downloadable!]
8. Marco Pagnozzi, 2006. "Are Disadvantaged Bidders Doomed in Ascending Auctions?," CSEF Working Papers 169, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Salerno, Italy. [Downloadable!]
9. Ed Hopkins & Tatiana Kornienko, 2007. "Cross and Double Cross: Comparative Statics in First Price Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000831, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
10. Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2000. "Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study," Virginia Economics Online Papers 347, University of Virginia, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
11. Jackson, Matther O. & Ilan Kremer, 2004. "The Relevance of a Choice of Auction Format in a Competitive Environment," Working Papers 1190, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
12. Ed Hopkins & Tatiana Kornienko, 2004. "Ratio Orderings and Comparative Statics," ESE Discussion Papers 91, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
13. Stephen Cameron & Shubham Chaudhuri & John McLaren, 2007. "Trade Shocks and Labor Adjustment: Theory," NBER Working Papers 13463, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Ed Hopkins & Tatiana Kornienko, 2007. "Cross and Double Cross: Comparative Statics in First Price and All Pay Auctions," Topics in Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 7(1), pages 1366-1366. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2000. "Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-045/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2002. "Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(3), pages 625-643, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Jackson, Matthew O. & Kremer, Ilan, 2002. "On the Concentration of Allocations and Comparisons of Auctions in Large Economies," Working Papers 1146, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Matthew O. Jackson & Ilan Kremer, 2002. "On the Concentration of Allocations and Comparisons of Auctions in Large Economies," Microeconomics 0211004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
17. Dakshina De Silva & Timothy Dunne & Anuruddha Kankanamge & Georgia Kosmopoulou, 2005. "The Impact of Public Information on Bidding in Highway Procurement Auctions," Microeconomics 0511011, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • De Silva, Dakshina G. & Dunne, Timothy & Kankanamge, Anuruddha & Kosmopoulou, Georgia, 2008. "The impact of public information on bidding in highway procurement auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 150-181, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)