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Imitation of Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma Games with Some Local Interaction

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Author Info
Maarten C.W. Janssen () (Erasmus University Rotterdam)
Abstract

In this paper I study conditions for the emergence of cooperative behavior in a dynamic model of population interaction. The model has finitely many individuals located on a circle. The pay- off of each individual is partly based on the (local) interaction with neighbors and partly on (uniform) interaction with the whole population. The dynamics is driven by imitative behavior. I show that for a large class of parameters cooperation will emerge if the population is large; if the population is small, defection will prevail in the long run. The result contrasts with conventional wisdom which says that the larger the population, the less likely cooperation will be.

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Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 00-019/1.

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Date of creation: 22 Mar 2000
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20000019

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Related research
Keywords: Cooperation; Prisoner's Dilemma; Evolutionary Game Theory; Local Interaction;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Bergstrom, Theodore C, 1995. "On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for Siblings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 58-81, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Ted Bergstrom & Oded Stark, 1993. "How Altruism Can Prevail in an Evolutionary Environment," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 1993B, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1997. "The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 375-384, March.
  4. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1990. "Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 274-79, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Nachbar, John H., 1992. "Evolution in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 307-326, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Huck, Steffen & Oechssler, Jorg, 1999. "The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 13-24, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. repec:att:wimass:199612r is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Stanley, E.A. & Ashlock, D. & Tesfatsion, Leigh S., 2004. "Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal of Partners," Staff General Research Papers 11180, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  9. Goyal, Sanjeev & Janssen, Maarten C. W., 1997. "Non-Exclusive Conventions and Social Coordination," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 34-57, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Jurjen Kamphorst & Gerard van der Laan, 2006. "Learning in a Local Interaction Hawk-Dove Game," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-034/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
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