The Political Economy of Regionalism
AbstractWe examine the incentives of regions in a country to unite or toseparate. We find that smaller regions have greater incentives tounite, relative to larger regions. We show, however, that on thewhole, majority voting on separation and union generates excessiveincentives to separate. This leads us to examine the scope ofalternative political institutions and rules in overcoming thepotential inefficiency. Our paper also provides a wide range ofexamples to illustrate the different institutions used in actualpractice to resolve such problems.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 00-014/1.
Date of creation: 02 Mar 2000
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Other versions of this item:
- Sanjeev Goyal & Klaas Staal, 2000. "The Political Economy of Regionalism," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0287, Econometric Society.
- NEP-ALL-2000-06-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2000-06-29 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-PUB-2000-06-29 (Public Finance)
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