In this paper we argue that authorities aid cooperation by means of direct coordination or the enforcement of re-commitment devices such as contract laws.Credible threats of violence allow this role. In a local interaction model, an authority forms if mutually connected individuals with sufficient combined punishment potential have signalled their willingness to form such an authority, conditional upon the willigness of others to do so. Given a specific timing of decisions, we analyse the conditions under which authorities arise and under which they evolve into a stationary state with only one or several remaining authorities.
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Karandikar, R. & Mokherjee, D. & Ray, D. & Vega-Redondo, F., 1996.
"Evolving Aspirations and Cooperation,"
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96-06, Valencia - Instituto de Investigaciones Economicas.