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Hurting hurts more than Helping helps: The Role of the Self-serving Bias Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Theo Offerman () (University of Amsterdam)
This paper investigates an implication of the self-serving bias for reciprocal responses. It is hypothesized that negative intentionality matters more than positive intentionality for reciprocating individuals with a self-serving attributional style. Experimental evidence obtained in the hot response game supports this prediction. Subjects are 67% more likely to reciprocate an intentional hurtful choice over an unintentional hurtful choice. Subjects are only 25% more likely to reciprocate an intentional helpful choice over an unintentional helpful choice. The evidence on the intermediating role of emotions is consistent with the explanation offered by the self-serving bias.
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Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number
99-018/1.
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Date of creation: 09 Mar 1999Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:19990018Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl/
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Keywords: reciprocity intentionality self-serving bias experiment Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports :
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