This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Hurting hurts more than Helping helps: The Role of the Self-serving Bias

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Theo Offerman () (University of Amsterdam)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper investigates an implication of the self-serving bias for reciprocal responses. It is hypothesized that negative intentionality matters more than positive intentionality for reciprocating individuals with a self-serving attributional style. Experimental evidence obtained in the hot response game supports this prediction. Subjects are 67% more likely to reciprocate an intentional hurtful choice over an unintentional hurtful choice. Subjects are only 25% more likely to reciprocate an intentional helpful choice over an unintentional helpful choice. The evidence on the intermediating role of emotions is consistent with the explanation offered by the self-serving bias.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.tinbergen.nl/discussionpapers/99018.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 99-018/1.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 09 Mar 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:19990018

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Walther Schoonenberg).

Related research
Keywords: reciprocity; intentionality; self-serving bias; experiment;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Akerlof, George A, 1982. "Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 97(4), pages 543-69, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Camerer, Colin, . "Progress and Behavioral Game Theory," Working Papers 1004, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  3. Blount, Sally, 1995. "When Social Outcomes Aren't Fair: The Effect of Causal Attributions on Preferences," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 131-144, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Akerlof, George A & Yellen, Janet L, 1988. "Fairness and Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 44-49, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Dufwenberg, M. & Kirchsteiger, G., 1998. "A theory of sequential reciprocity," Discussion Paper 37, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Akerlof, George A & Yellen, Janet L, 1990. "The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(2), pages 255-83, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Fehr, Ernst & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Riedl, Arno, 1998. "Gift exchange and reciprocity in competitive experimental markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-34, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Bolton, G.E. & Brandts, J. & Ockenfels, A., 1997. "Measuring Motivations for the Reciprocal Responses Observed in a Simple Dilemma Game," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 400.97, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    Other versions:
  9. Fehr, Ernst & Kirchsteiger, George & Riedl, Arno, 1993. "Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(2), pages 437-59, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness, 1998. "Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games," Economics Working Papers 321, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Babcock, Linda, et al, 1995. "Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1337-43, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Babcock, Linda & Loewenstein, George, 1997. "Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(1), pages 109-26, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. David K Levine, 1997. "Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2047, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Sugden, Robert, 1984. "Reciprocity: The Supply of Public Goods through Voluntary Contributions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(376), pages 772-87, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. McKelvey, Richard D & Page, Talbot, 1990. "Public and Private Information: An Experimental Study of Information Pooling," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1321-39, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," IEW - Working Papers iewwp004, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  17. Gary Charness, 1996. "Attribution and Reciprocity in a Simulated Labor Market: An Experimental Investigation," Economics Working Papers 283, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Oct 1997. [Downloadable!]
  18. Gary E. Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Camerer, Colin F, 1997. "Progress in Behavioral Game Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 167-88, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Bolton, G & Brandts, J & Katok, E, 1996. "A Simple Test of Explanations for Contributions in Social Dilemmas," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 360.96, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness, 1999. "Retribution in a Cheap-talk Experiment," Economics Working Papers 437, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  2. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher & Elena Tougareva, . "Do High Stakes and Competition Undermine Fairness? Evidence from Russia," IEW - Working Papers iewwp120, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
  3. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2000. "Social Preferences: Some Simple Tests and a New Model," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1483, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Ernst Fehr & Klaus Schmidt, 2000. "Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity -- Evidence and Economic Applications," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Ronald Bosman & Frans van Winden, 2000. "The Behavioral Impact of Emotions in a Power-to-Take Game: An Experimental Study," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  6. Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness, 2000. "Do Market Conditions Affect Preferences? Evidence from Experimental Markets with Excess Supply and Excess Demand," Economics Working Papers 491, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  7. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2002. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series 1042, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Luca Stanca & Luigino Bruni & Luca Corazzini, 2007. "Testing Theories of Reciprocity: Do Motivations Matter?," Working Papers 109, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised 2007. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Nicholas Bardsley, 2000. "Control Without Deception: Individual Behaviour in Free-Riding Experiments Revisited," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 215-240, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Khan, Hayat, 2009. "Modeling Social Preferences: A Generalized Model of Inequity Aversion," MPRA Paper 14701, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 13 May 2009. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Jordi Brandts & Gary Charnes, . "Retribution In A Cheap-Talk Experiment," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 454.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
  13. Gary E. Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "A stress test of fairness measures in models of social utility," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-29, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Falk, Armin & Fehr, Ernst & Fischbacher, Urs, 2001. "On the Nature of Fair Behaviour," CEPR Discussion Papers 2984, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. Ronald Bosman & Frans van Winden, 2002. "Emotional Hazard in a Power-to-take Experiment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(476), pages 147-169, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Nicholas Bardsley, 2000. "Control without Deception," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-107/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  17. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 2005. "The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories," Discussion Papers 66, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  18. Luca Stanca, Luigino Bruni, Luca Corazzini, 2007. "Testing Theories of Reciprocity: Does Motivation Matter?," ISLA Working Papers 29, ISLA, Centre for research on Latin American Studies and Transition Economies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy. [Downloadable!]
  19. Ronald Bosman & Frans A.A.M. van Winden, 1999. "The Behavioral Impact of Emotions in a Power to take Game: An Experimental Study," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 99-039/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  20. James Cox & Klarita Sadiraj & Vjollca Sadiraj, 2008. "Implications of trust, fear, and reciprocity for modeling economic behavior," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 1-24, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? A tutorial is available.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-19.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.