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The Performance of Professionals and Students in an Experimental Study of Lobbying

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Author Info
Jan Potters () (Tilburg University)
Frans van Winden () (University of Amsterdam)

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Abstract

This paper reports on a series of signaling game experiments in which an informed sender can send a costly message in order to persuade an uninformed responder. We compare the behavior of two subject pools: 142 undergraduate stu- dents and 30 public affairs officials who are professionally familiar with strategic information transmission. We find some differences between the two subject pools in their roles of senders. Professional subjects behave more in line with the game-theoretic predictions, display a higher degree of separation, and earn more money. These differences are small and only weakly or marginally significant, though. Moreover, with respect to the more substantive qualitative questions regarding the impact of parameter changes and patterns of learning and adaptation we find no differences between the two subject pools. Our conclusion is that the differences are not strong and systematic enough as to invalidate experimental results obtained with student subjects.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 98-008/1.

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Date of creation: 30 Jan 1998
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:19980008

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Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl/

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Kenneth S. Chan & Stuart Mestelman & R. Andrew Muller, 1998. "Voluntary Provision of Public Goods," McMaster Experimental Economics Laboratory Publications 1998-02, McMaster University. [Downloadable!]
  2. Potters, Jan & van Winden, Frans, 1996. "Comparative Statics of a Signaling Game: An Experimental Study," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 329-53.
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  3. Cheung, Yin-Wong & Friedman, Daniel, 1997. "Individual Learning in Normal Form Games: Some Laboratory Results," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 46-76, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Potters, Jan & van Winden, Frans, 1992. " Lobbying and Asymmetric Information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 269-92, October.
  5. Plott, Charles R, 1982. "Industrial Organization Theory and Experimental Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 20(4), pages 1485-1527, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Selten, Reinhard, 1991. "Evolution, learning, and economic behavior," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 3-24, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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