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Experimental Economics and Deception: A Comment

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Author Info
Chris Starmer (University of East Anglia)
Tanga McDaniel (University of Amsterdam)

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Abstract

The predominant view amongst experimental economists is that deception should, as far as possible, be avoided in economics experiments. This paper was written in response to an article which challenges that conventional view and suggests that there are positive reasons for using deception and "little evidence to support the argument that deception should be proscribed". We argue that the author underestimates the potential problems associated with deception and, in some cases, overstates the benefits. Correspondingly, this comment advocates a much more cautious position. In our conclusion we suggest that prohibition of deceptive methods in experimental economics should be the default position.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 97-101/1.

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Date of creation: 01 Oct 1997
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:19970101

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Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl/

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  1. Andreas Ortmann & Ralph Hertwig, 2001. "The Costs of Deception: Evidence From Psychology," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp191, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Nicholas Bardsley, 2000. "Control Without Deception: Individual Behaviour in Free-Riding Experiments Revisited," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 215-240, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Jamison, Julian & Karlan, Dean & Schechter, Laura, 2006. "To Deceive or Not to Deceive: The Effect of Deception on Behavior inFuture Laboratory Experiments," Working Papers 18, Yale University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Nicholas Bardsley, 2000. "Control without Deception," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-107/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-3.


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