Chris Starmer (University of East Anglia) Tanga McDaniel (University of Amsterdam)
Abstract
The predominant view amongst experimental economists is that deception should, as far as possible, be avoided in economics experiments. This paper was written in response to an article which challenges that conventional view and suggests that there are positive reasons for using deception and "little evidence to support the argument that deception should be proscribed". We argue that the author underestimates the potential problems associated with deception and, in some cases, overstates the benefits. Correspondingly, this comment advocates a much more cautious position. In our conclusion we suggest that prohibition of deceptive methods in experimental economics should be the default position.
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