An interest group's choice between lobbying politicians and lobbying bureaucrats, and the decision of politicians whether to delegate policy authority, are investigated simultaneously. Lobbying is modeled as strategic information transmission. By assumption only bureaucrats have the expertise to assess policy relevant information coming from interest groups. Politicians may therefore want to delegate policy authority to them, but they are aware of the different interests bureaucrats may have. In equilibrium politicians weigh the benefits from a more informed policy decision against the shift in policy that is finally implemented. Delegation only occurs when the bureaucracy is not extremely biased, the stakes of the interest group in persuading government are low, and when the group has moderate access to bureaucrats. Surprisingly, politicians sometimes prefer a biased bureaucracy over an unbiased one. The model predicts that in general interest groups may lobby politicians for delegation in some instances, and for no-delegation at other instances. But, under reasonable assumptions they typically lobby politicians to induce delegation.
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