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The Incidence of Overdissipation in Rent-Seeking Contests

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Author Info
Michael R. Baye (The Pennsylvania State University)
Dan Kovenock (Purdue University)
Casper G. de Vries () (Erasmus University Rotterdam)

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Abstract

This paper reconsiders Tullock's analysis of rent seeking and wasteful overdissipation. The purpose of this paper is to point out that even though his original analysis of overdissipation is technically flawed, the definition of overdissipation can be modified to explain instances in which rational rent-seekers spend more to win a prize than the prize is worth. We showed before that equilibrium mixed strategies in the Tullock game do not permit overdissipation in expectation: the expected total amount spent competing for rents cannot exceed the value of the prize. However, since the equilibrium involves mixed-strategies for particular realizations of the mixed strategies the total amount spent competing for rents can exceed the value of the prize! In fact, we show that the cross-sectional incidence of overdissipation may be quite high. For a symmetric perfectly discriminating contest (R = &inf;), the probability of overdissipation in a symmetric equilibrium ranges from exactly one-half in the two player case to approximately .44 as the number of players approaches infinity.

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Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 97-045/2.

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Date of creation: 15 May 1997
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:19970045

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Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl/

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  1. Kai A. Konrad & Dan Kovenock, 2006. "Multi-battle contests," Discussion Papers 122, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Eric Langlais & Bruno Lovat & Francesco Parisi, 2007. "Crowding-out in Productive and Redistributive Rent-Seeking," Working Papers of BETA 2007-02, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, ULP, Strasbourg. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. repec:att:wimass:1919986 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Alexander Matros & Wooyoung Lim, 2007. "Contests with a Stochastic Number of Players," Working Papers 323, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2007. [Downloadable!]
  5. Cotton, Christopher, 2007. "Informational Lobbying and Competition for Access," MPRA Paper 1842, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  6. Christopher J. Ellis & John Fender, 2007. "Public Sector Capital and the Transition from Dictatorship to Democracy," Discussion Papers 07-14, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham. [Downloadable!]
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