This paper studies the regulation of input related externalities with heterogeneous firms. The efficiency of such policies strongly depends on the incentives given for both output reduction and input substitution. The resulting endogeneity of cost functions may lead to relatively complicated policy rules, especially when second-best instruments are used. For the derivation of such policy rules, a mathematical formulation is presented that is able to deal with these complications. Policy rules will be derived, and the relative efficiency will be analysed for first-best input taxes and for two second-best instruments, namely output taxes and standards.
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Walther Schoonenberg).
Related research
Keywords:
Other versions of this item:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)