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Evolutionary Game Theory and the Modelling of Economic Behavior

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  • Gerard van der Laan

    ()
    (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

  • A.F. Tieman

    ()
    (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

Abstract

Since the 1950's economists applied game theoretical concepts to a wide variety of economic problems. The Nash equilibrium concept has proven to be a powerful instrument in analyzing the outcome of economic processes. Since the late 1980's economists also show a growing interest in the application of evolutionary game theory. This paper discusses the main concepts of evolutionarygame theory and their applicability to economic issues. Whereas traditional game theory focusses on the static Nash equilibria as the possible outcomes of the game, evolutionary game theory teaches us to model explictly the behavior of individuals outside equilibrium. This may provide us with a better understanding of the dynamic forces within a society of interacting individuals.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 96-172/8.

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Date of creation: 19 Nov 1996
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:19960172

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Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl

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  1. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December.
  2. Daniel Friedman, 2010. "On Economic Applications of Evolutionary Game Theory," Levine's Working Paper Archive 53, David K. Levine.
  3. Yang, Z.F., 1996. "Simplicial Fixed Point Algorithms and Applications," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-73465, Tilburg University.
  4. Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Schwalbe, Ulrich, 1996. "Evolution, interaction, and Nash equilibria," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 57-85, January.
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  8. Samuelson, L. & Zhang, J., 1990. "Evolutionary Stability In Symmetric Games," Working papers 90-24, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  9. Damme, E.E.C. van, 1994. "Evolutionary game theory," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154415, Tilburg University.
  10. J. Bergin & B. Lipman, 2010. "Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 486, David K. Levine.
  11. Ellison, G., 1996. "Basins of Attraction, Long Run Equilibria, and the Speed of Step-by- Step Evolution," Working papers 96-4, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  12. Nachbar, J H, 1990. ""Evolutionary" Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 59-89.
  13. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, December.
  14. Gale, John & Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1995. "Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 56-90.
  15. Samuelson, Larry & Zhang, Jianbo, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 363-391, August.
  16. Laan, G. van der & Talman, A.J.J., 1985. "Adjustment processes for finding economic equilibria," Research Memorandum 174, Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
  17. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-66, May.
  18. Kamiya, Kazuya, 1990. "A Globally Stable Price Adjustment Process," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1481-85, November.
  19. Schlag, Karl H., 1994. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? Exploring a Model of Social Evolution," Discussion Paper Serie B 296, University of Bonn, Germany.
  20. Selten,Reinhard, . "Evolution,learning and economic behaviour," Discussion Paper Serie B 132, University of Bonn, Germany.
  21. Matsui, Akihiko, 1992. "Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 343-362, August.
  22. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  23. Talman, A.J.J. & Laan , G. van der, 1982. "On the computation of fixed points on the product space of unit simplices and an application to noncooperative N-person games," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-153028, Tilburg University.
  24. Arthur J Robson & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1999. "Efficient Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Random Matching," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2112, David K. Levine.
  25. Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L. & Gale, J., 1993. "Learning to be Imperfect: The Ultimatum Game," Working papers 9325, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  26. Richard R. Nelson, 1995. "Recent Evolutionary Theorizing about Economic Change," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 33(1), pages 48-90, March.
  27. Glen Ellison, 2010. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391, David K. Levine.
  28. Xander F. Tieman & Gerard van der Laan & Harold Houba, 1996. "Bertrand Price Competition in a Social Environment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 96-140/8, Tinbergen Institute.
  29. Mailath, George J., 1992. "Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 259-277, August.
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Cited by:
  1. ZHOU, Chaohong & VAN WITTELOOSTUIJN, Arjen, 2009. "Evolutionary game theory and organizational ecology: The case of resource-partitioning theory," ACED Working Papers 2009001, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
  2. Garrouste, Christelle & Loi, Massimo, 2009. "Applications De La Theorie Des Jeux A L'Education: Pour Quels Types Et Niveaux D'Education, Quels Modeles, Quels Resultats?
    [Applications of Game Theory in Education - What Types and At What Levels
    ," MPRA Paper 31825, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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