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Bertrand Price Competition in a Social Environment

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Author Info
Xander F. Tieman () (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
Gerard van der Laan () (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
Harold Houba () (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

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Abstract

In this paper the behavior of producers in a social environment is considered from a more sociological point of view than is usually done in economics. The producers play Bertrand price competition against each other and change the action they played based upon the outcome of the game, according to a metastrategy. This metastrategy is a sociological behavioral rule, based on the notion of fairness or aspiration level. In this way an evolutionary process is specified.
The main result is that the emergence of cooperative behavior can be explained by this evolutionary process which incorporates behavioral rules. The model also shows that occasionally price wars may occur.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 96-140/8.

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Date of creation: 17 Sep 1996
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:19960140

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Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl/

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Related research
Keywords: Evolutionary game theory; Social interaction; Bertrand price competition; Evolution of Cooperation;

Cited by:
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  1. Paul Frijters & Alexander F. Tieman, 1999. "The Role and Evolution of Central Authorities," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 99-053/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Gerard van der Laan & A.F. Tieman, 1996. "Evolutionary Game Theory and the Modelling of Economic Behavior," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 96-172/8, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-3.


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