Lords of Uhuru: the political economy of elite competition and institutional change in post-independence Kenya
AbstractThe post-independence history of Kenya is characterized by an unusual mix of stability with ever-lingering fragility. The high level of elite persistence in Kenya could be seen both as a cause and a result of this peculiar nature of the political economy of the country. This paper has the objective of studying the effects of historical elite competition and consolidation on political-economic stability and institutional transition in post-independence Kenya. The logic of the natural state is applied to organize the narrative and analyze the key features (North, Wallis and Weingast (2009), Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History: Cambridge University Press). Most of the existing institutional structures in Kenya are built on elite configurations inherited from the colonial times. The robust growth performance of the first decade after independence was generated by smallholder agriculture, while most of the rent was transferred to the elite via state patronage. The political instability of the later years had a lot to do with dwindling patronage resources and elite fragmentation. For most part of the political economy history of the country, patron-client networks and tribalism have played key role in regulating intra-elite bargains. Land has always been the leverage used by the elite to manipulate the aforementioned structures. Although the Kenyan elite have maintained keen interest in winning via constitutional means, they have kept reverting to extralegal avenues whenever intra-elite negotiations seemed to have failed to be enforced.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by United Nations University, Maastricht Economic and social Research and training centre on Innovation and Technology in its series UNU-MERIT Working Paper Series with number 042.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.merit.unu.edu
elites; dominant coalition; economic growth; institutional change; Kenya;
Other versions of this item:
- Bedasso, Biniam, 2012. "Lords of Uhuru: the political economy of elite competition and institutional change in post-independence Kenya," MERIT Working Papers 042, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- O55 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Africa
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-05-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2012-05-22 (Development)
- NEP-HIS-2012-05-22 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Eliakim Katz & Jacob Rosenberg, 1989. "Rent-seeking for budgetary allocation: Preliminary results for 20 countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 60(2), pages 133-144, February.
- Himbara, David, 1994. "The failed Africanization of commerce and industry in Kenya," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 469-482, March.
- Arbache, Jorge Saba & Page, John, 2008.
"Hunting for Leopards: Long-Run Country Income Dynamics in Africa,"
Working Paper Series
RP2008/80, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
- Arbache, Jorge Saba & Page, John, 2008. "Hunting for Leopards : long run country income dynamics in Africa," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4715, The World Bank.
- Willa Friedman & Michael Kremer & Edward Miguel & Rebecca Thornton, 2011. "Education as Liberation?," NBER Working Papers 16939, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Montalvo, Jose G. & Reynal-Querol, Marta, 2005. "Ethnic diversity and economic development," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 293-323, April.
- Bigsten, Arne & Moene, Karl Ove, 1996. "Growth and Rent Dissipation: The Case of Kenya," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), vol. 5(2), pages 177-98, June.
- Mwangi S. Kimenyi & William F. Shughart II, 2008.
"The Political Economy of Constitutional Choice: A Study of the 2005 Kenyan Constitutional Referendum,"
2008-08, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Mwangi Kimenyi & William Shughart, 2010. "The political economy of constitutional choice: a study of the 2005 Kenyan constitutional referendum," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 1-27, March.
- wa Githinji, Mwangi, 2000. "Income Distribution and Dualism: The Case of Kenya," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(3), pages 326-39, October.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ad Notten).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.