Firms and apprentices have conflicting interests with respect to the content of training programmes. On the basis of a model for the investment decision in occupation-specific and generic training, I will show that, in the case of imperfect competition, firms are not only unwilling to pay for generic training, they also want this component to be as low as possible because it decreases their expected returns to occupation-specific training. Therefore the generic component of the training will be below the social optimum. This underinvestment problem cannot always be solved by having the generic component fixed at the social optimum by an external training body. Fixing the generic component may negatively affect the level of occupation-specific training and decrease social welfare.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Maastricht : ROA, Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market in its series Research Memoranda with number
001.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: