Occupation Specific or Generic Skills? Conflicting Interests of Firms and Apprentices
AbstractFirms and apprentices have conflicting interests with respect to the content of training programmes. On the basis of a model for the investment decision in occupation-specific and generic training, I will show that, in the case of imperfect competition, firms are not only unwilling to pay for generic training, they also want this component to be as low as possible because it decreases their expected returns to occupation-specific training. Therefore the generic component of the training will be below the social optimum. This underinvestment problem cannot always be solved by having the generic component fixed at the social optimum by an external training body. Fixing the generic component may negatively affect the level of occupation-specific training and decrease social welfare.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Maastricht : ROA, Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market in its series Research Memoranda with number 001.
Date of creation: 2001
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education; training and the labour market;
Other versions of this item:
- Smits,W, 2002. "Occupation Specific or Generic Skills? Conflicting Interests of Firms and Apprentices," Research Memoranda 001, Maastricht : ROA, Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market.
- NEP-ALL-2002-12-17 (All new papers)
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