Measuring the Distribution of Spitefulness
AbstractSpiteful, antisocial behavior undermines the moral and institutional fabric of society, producingdisorder, fear and mistrust. Previous research demonstrates the willingness of individuals to harmothers, but little is understood about how far people are willing to go in being spiteful or theirconsistency in spitefulness across repeated trials. Our experiment is the first to provideindividuals with repeated opportunities to spitefully harm anonymous others when the decisionentails zero cost to the spiter and cannot be observed by the object of spite. This method revealsthat the majority of individuals exhibit consistent (non-)spitefulness over time and that thedistribution of spitefulness is bipolar: when choosing whether to be spiteful, most individualseither avoid spite altogether or impose the maximum possible harm on their unwitting victims.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization in its series Research Memoranda with number 040.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/web/UMPublications.htm
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Roth, Alvin & Ockenfels, Axel & Ariely, Dan, 2005.
"An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions,"
2579649, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Dan Ariely & Axel Ockenfels & Alvin E. Roth, 2005. "An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(4), pages 890-907, Winter.
- Dan Ariely & Axel Ockenfels & Alvin E. Roth, 2002. "An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-47, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Dan Ariely & Axel Ockenfels & Alvin E Roth, 2003. "An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000433, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Dan Ariely & Axel Ockenfels & Alvin E. Roth, 2003. "An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series 987, CESifo Group Munich.
- Abbink, Klaus & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim, 2009.
"The pleasure of being nasty,"
Elsevier, vol. 105(3), pages 306-308, December.
- Cason, T.N. & Saijo, T. & Yamato, T., 1998.
"Voluntary Participation and Spite in Public Good Provision Experiments: an International Comparison,"
98-002, Purdue University, Krannert School of Management - Center for International Business Education and Research (CIBER).
- Timothy Cason & Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Takehiko Yamato, 2002. "Voluntary Participation and Spite in Public Good Provision Experiments: An International Comparison," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 133-153, October.
- Cason, T.N. & Saijo, T. & Yamato, T., 2000. "Voluntary Participation and Spite in Public Good Provision Experiments: an International Comparison," ISER Discussion Paper 0491, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Ernst Fehr & Karla Hoff & Mayuresh Kshetramade, 2008.
"Spite and Development,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 98(2), pages 494-99, May.
- Morgan John & Steiglitz Ken & Reis George, 2003. "The Spite Motive and Equilibrium Behavior in Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-27, April.
- Daniel Houser & Erte Xiao, 2009.
1009, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
- David J. Cooper & Hanming Fang, 2006.
"Understanding Overbidding in Second Price Auctions: An Experimental Study,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1557, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- DavidJ. Cooper & Hanming Fang, 2008. "Understanding Overbidding In Second Price Auctions: An Experimental Study," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(532), pages 1572-1595, October.
- Naoko Nishimura & Timothy N. Cason & Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Yoshikazu Ikeda, 2011. "Spite and Reciprocity in Auctions," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 2(3), pages 365-411, September.
- Le Zhang & Andreas Ortmann, 2012. "On the Interpretation of Giving, Taking, and Destruction in Dictator Games and Joy-of-Destruction Games," Discussion Papers 2012-50, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Charles Bollen).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.