Impossibilities with Kemeny updating
AbstractImpossibility theorems for preference correspondences based on a new monotonicity concept arediscussed. Here monotonicity means that if preferences update in such a way that they get closerto an outcome then at the new situation this outcome remains chosen. Strong monotonicity requiresfurther that in those cases the outcome at the new profile is a subset of the outcome at the oldprofile. It is shown that only dictatorial preference correspondences are unanimous and stronglymonotone.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization in its series Research Memoranda with number 049.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/web/UMPublications.htm
Other versions of this item:
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-01-03 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
- Muller, Eitan & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1977. "The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 412-418, April.
- Can Burak & Storcken Ton, 2011.
"Update Monotone Preference Rules,"
048, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Charles Bollen).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.