Borel Games with Lower-Semi-Continuous Payoffs
AbstractWe prove that every multi-player Borel game with bounded and lower-semi-continuous payoffs admits a subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibrium in pure strategies. This result complements Example 3 in Solan and Vieille (2003), which shows that a subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibrium in pure strategies need not exist when the payoffs are not lower-semi-continuous. In addition, if the range of payoffs is finite, we characterize in the form of a Folk Theorem the set of all plays and payoffs that are induced by subgame-perfect 0-equilibria in pure strategies.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization in its series Research Memoranda with number 040.
Date of creation: 2010
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