Let me sleep on it: Delay reduces rejection rates in Ultimatum Games
AbstractWe show that delaying acceptance decisions in the Ultimatum Game drastically increases acceptance rates of low offers. While in standard treatments without delay less than 20% of low offers are accepted, these numbers increase to around 65-75% as we delay the acceptance decisions by around 10 minutes. Our findings provide precise evidence for familiar notions such as ''sleeping on it'' and show that there may be a good reason why public administrations often communicate bad news on Friday afternoons. They shed new light on recent evidence in Neuroscience on brain activation after receiving bad news and raise questions about the extent to which decisions reveal the preferences of a decision-maker.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization in its series Research Memoranda with number 017.
Date of creation: 2010
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Web page: http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/web/UMPublications.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Grimm, Veronika & Mengel, Friederike, 2011. "Let me sleep on it: Delay reduces rejection rates in ultimatum games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 113-115, May.
- NEP-ALL-2010-04-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2010-04-04 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2010-04-04 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2010-04-04 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2010-04-04 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- David Cooper & E. Dutcher, 2011. "The dynamics of responder behavior in ultimatum games: a meta-study," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 519-546, November.
Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- Let Me Sleep On It: Delay Reduces Rejection Rates
by Ariel Goldring in Free Market Mojo on 2010-05-14 13:07:57
- Werner Güth & Martin G. Kocher, 2013.
"More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature,"
Jena Economic Research Papers
2013-035, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
- Werner Güth & Martin G. Kocher, 2013. "More than Thirty Years of Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments: Motives, Variations, and a Survey of the Recent Literature," CESifo Working Paper Series 4380, CESifo Group Munich.
- Cappelletti, Dominique & Güth, Werner & Ploner, Matteo, 2011. "Being of two minds: Ultimatum offers under cognitive constraints," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 940-950.
- Fabio Galeotti, 2013. "An Experiment on Waiting Time and Punishing Behavior," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(2), pages 1383-1389.
- Paolo Crosetto & Werner Güth & Luigi Mittone & Matteo Ploner, 2012. "Motives of Sanctioning: Equity and Emotions in a Public Good Experiment with Punishment," Jena Economic Research Papers 2012-046, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
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