We show that in the canonical non-cooperative multilateral bargaining game, a subgameperfect equilibrium exists in pure stationary strategies, even when the space of feasible payoffs is not convex. At such an equilibrium there is no delay. We also have the converse result that randomization will not be used in this environment in the sense that all stationary subgame perfect equilibria do not involve randomization on the equilibrium path. Nevertheless, mixed strategy profiles can lead to Pareto superior payoffs in non-convex cases.
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Paper provided by Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization in its series Research Memoranda with number
042.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
David A. Jaeger & Holger Bonin & Thomas Dohmen & Armin Falk & David Huffman & Uwe Sunde, 2007.
"Direct Evidence on Risk Attitudes and Migration,"
Working Papers
50, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
David A. Jaeger & Holger Bonin & Thomas Dohmen & Armin Falk & David Huffman & Uwe Sunde, 2007.
"Direct Evidence on Risk Attitudes and Migration,"
CReAM Discussion Paper Series
0703, Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration (CReAM), Department of Economics, University College London.
[Downloadable!]