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Never change a winning team: The effect of substitutions on success in football tournaments Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Mengel Friederike (METEOR)
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We identify a strong and significant negative effect of substitutions in (irrelevant) early games in worldcup and olympic football tournaments on performance in later rounds. We argue that this effect is due to the psychological consequences of such a decision and evaluate alternative possible explanations.
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Paper provided by Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization in its series Research Memoranda with number
027.
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Date of creation: 2009Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dgr:umamet:2009027Contact details of provider: Web page: http://edocs.ub.unimaas.nl/
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Keywords: Economics (Jel: A) ; Other versions of this item:
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