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Pure Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Free Transition Games

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Author Info

  • Kuipers, Jeroen
  • Flesch, Janos
  • Schoenmakers, Gijs
  • Vrieze, Koos

    (METEOR)

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    Abstract

    We consider a class of stochastic games, where each state is identified with a player. At any moment during play, one of the players is called active. The active player can terminate the game, or he can announce any player, who then becomes the active player. There is a non-negative payoff for each player upon termination of the game, which depends only on the player who decided to terminate. We give a combinatorial proof of the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria in pure strategies for the games in our class.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization in its series Research Memoranda with number 027.

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    Date of creation: 2008
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    Handle: RePEc:dgr:umamet:2008027

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    Web page: http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/web/UMPublications.htm

    Related research

    Keywords: mathematical economics;

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    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1983. "Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 251-268, December.
    2. Eilon Solan, 2002. "Subgame-Perfection in Quitting Games with Perfect Information and Differential Equations," Discussion Papers 1356, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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    Cited by:
    1. Flesch J. & Kuipers J. & Schoenmakers G. & Vrieze K., 2011. "Subgame-Perfection in Free Transition Games," Research Memoranda 047, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.

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