A population''s level of terrorism depends on two factors: people''s preferences (would they like creating damage?) and the constraints under which people act (what damage could they create, and at what punishment?). Cause-related policies, e.g. improving social stability or education, aim at appeasing preferences, thereby reducing terrorism. Symptom-related policies, e.g. embargoes or wars, change the constraints (`deterrence''), but may have side effects on preferences (`provocation''); terrorism increases if provocation overweighs deterrence. I model preferences for damage as endogenous and policy-dependent. I argue that provocation by tough policies is easy to overlook, and show that provocation-neglect leads to toughness-exaggeration.
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Paper provided by Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization in its series Research Memoranda with number
011.
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