Non-monotonic Repayment Contracts are Superior: An Experimental Approach
AbstractWe experimentally investigate if theoretically superior non-monotonic repayment contracts yield superior results in the laboratory. We find replacing standard debt contracts with repayment-equivalent non-monotonic contracts increases entrepreneurial income by 170% and total surplus by 30%.
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Date of creation: 2007
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financial economics and financial management ;
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