Competition and Resource Sensitivity in Marriage and Roommate Markets
AbstractWe consider one-to-one matching markets in which agents can either be matched as pairs or remain single. In these so-called roommate markets agents are consumers and resources at the same time. We investigate two new properties that capture the effect a newcomer has on incumbent agents. Competition sensitivity focuses on the newcomer as additional consumer and requires that some incumbents will suffer if competition is caused by a newcomer. Resource sensitivity focuses on the newcomer as additional resource and requires that this is beneficial for some incumbents. For solvable roommate markets, we provide the first characterizations of the core using either competition or resource sensitivity. On the class of all roommate markets, we obtain two associated impossibility results.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization in its series Research Memoranda with number 046.
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/web/UMPublications.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Klaus, Bettina, 2011. "Competition and resource sensitivity in marriage and roommate markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 172-186, May.
- Bettina Klaus, 2010. "Competition and Resource Sensitivity in Marriage and Roommate Markets," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du DÃ©partement d'EconomÃ©trie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 10.03, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
- Bettina Klaus, 2007. "Competition and Resource Sensitivity in Marriage and Roommate Markets," Harvard Business School Working Papers 09-072, Harvard Business School, revised Dec 2008.
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-02-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2008-02-02 (Game Theory)
- NEP-LAB-2008-02-02 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2008-02-02 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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