Judgment aggregation with consistency alone
AbstractAll existing impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation require individual and collective judgment sets to be consistent and complete (in some recent results with completeness relaxed to deductive closure), arguably a demanding rationality requirement. They do not carry over to aggregation functions mapping profiles of (merely) consistent individual judgment sets to (merely) consistent collective ones. We prove that, whenever the agenda of propositions under consideration exhibits mild interconnections, any such aggregation function that is "neutral" between the acceptance and rejection of each proposition is dictatorial. We relate this theorem to the literature.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization in its series Research Memoranda with number 021.
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- Christian List & Ben Polak, 2010.
"Introduction to Judgment Aggregation,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1753, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- García-Bermejo, Juan Carlos, 2012. "A Pooling Approach to Judgment Aggregation," Working Papers in Economic Theory 2012/01, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis (Economic Theory and Economic History).
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