We investigate the algorithmic performance of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms in the single item case. We provide a formal definition of a Vickrey algorithm for this framework, and give a number of examples of Vickrey algorithms. We consider three performance criteria, one corresponding to a Pareto criterion, one corresponding to worst case analysis, and a third criterion related to first-order stochastic dominance. We show that Pareto optimal Vickrey algorithms do not exist and that worst case analysis is of no use in discriminating between Vickrey algorithms. For the case of two bidders, we show the bisection auction to be optimal according to the third criterion. The bisection auction istherefore optimal in a very strong sense.
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Paper provided by Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization in its series Research Memoranda with number
013.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Grigorieva,Elena & Herings,P. Jean-Jacques & Müller,Rudolf & Vermeulen,Dries, 2002.
"The private value single item bisection auction,"
Research Memoranda
051, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
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