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Sequential Coalition Formation and the Core in the Presence of Externalities

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Author Info
Kóczy, Lászlo Á. (METEOR)

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Abstract

Bloch (1996) presents a novel method to solve cooperative games with externalities. When trying to relate this to classical approaches he could only present negative results. We elaborate on these problems, define a modification of Bloch''s model and show that its order-independent equilibria coincide with the (pessimistic) recursive core.

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Paper provided by Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization in its series Research Memoranda with number 047.

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Date of creation: 2006
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:umamet:2006047

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Keywords: Economics (Jel: A);

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  1. Perry, Motty & Reny, Philip J, 1994. "A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 795-817, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Kóczy, Lászlo Á., 2006. "Sequential Coalition Formation and the Core in the Presence of Externalities," Research Memoranda 047, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Chatterjee, Kalyan & Bhaskar Dutta & Debraj Ray & Kunal Sengupta, 1993. "A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 60(2), pages 463-77, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Lagunoff Roger D., 1994. "A Simple Noncooperative Core Story," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 54-61, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Huang, Chen-Ying & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2006. "Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(6), pages 771-793, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Bloch, Francis, 1996. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 90-123, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Kóczy, László Á., 2008. "Stationary quasi-perfect equilibrium partitions constitute the recursive core," Research Memoranda 028, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  2. László Á. Kóczy, 2006. "Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities," Working Paper Series 0801, Budapest Tech, Keleti Faculty of Economics, revised Apr 2008. [Downloadable!]
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  3. László Kóczy, 2007. "A recursive core for partition function form games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 41-51, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. László Á. Kóczy, 2009. "Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core," Working Paper Series 0905, Budapest Tech, Keleti Faculty of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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