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Judgment aggregation on restricted domains

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Author Info
Dietrich Franz
List Christian (METEOR)

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Abstract

We show that, when a group takes independent majority votes on interconnected propositions, the outcome is consistent once the profile of individual judgment sets respects appropriate structural conditions. We introduce several such conditions on profiles, based on ordering the propositions or ordering the individuals, and we clarify the relations between these conditions. By restricting the conditions to appropriate subagendas, we obtain local conditions that are less demanding but still guarantee consistent majority judgments. By applying the conditions to agendas representing preference aggregation problems, we show parallels of some conditions to existing social-choice-theoretic conditions, specifically to order restriction and intermediateness, restricted to triples of alternatives in the case of our local conditions.

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Paper provided by Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization in its series Research Memoranda with number 033.

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Date of creation: 2006
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:umamet:2006033

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Keywords: mathematical economics

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  1. Rothkopf, Michael H & Teisberg, Thomas J & Kahn, Edward P, 1990. "Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(1), pages 94-109, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Plum, M, 1992. "Characterization and Computation of Nash-Equilibria for Auctions with Incomplete Information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 393-418.
  3. Menezes, Flavio M. & Monteiro, Paulo K., 2004. "Auctions with synergies and asymmetric buyers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 287-294, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 2000. "Asymmetric Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 67(3), pages 413-38, July.
  5. Branco, Fernando, 1997. "Sequential auctions with synergies: An example," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 159-163, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Grigorieva Elena & Herings P. Jean-Jacques & Müller Rudolf & Vermeulen Dries, 2006. "Inefficiency of equilibria in query auctions with continuous valuations," Research Memoranda 017, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  7. Thomas D. Jeitschko & Elmar Wolfstetter, 2002. "Scale Economies and the Dynamics of Recurring Auctions," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 40(3), pages 403-414, July.
  8. Marc S. Robinson, 1985. "Collusion and the Choice of Auction," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(1), pages 141-145, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Holt, Charles A, Jr, 1980. "Competitive Bidding for Contracts under Alternative Auction Procedures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(3), pages 433-45, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Leufkens Kasper & Peeters Ronald & Vermeulen Dries, 2006. "Sequential Auctions with Synergies: The Paradox of Positive Synergies," Research Memoranda 018, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  11. Tang Sorensen, Soren, 2006. "Sequential auctions for stochastically equivalent complementary objects," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(3), pages 337-342, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Hopenhayn, Hugo, 2004. "Tacit collusion in repeated auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 153-169, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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