We present a new solution to partition function form games that is novel in at least two ways. Firstly, the solution exploits the consistency of the partition function form, namely that the response to a deviation is established as the same solution applied to the residual game, itself a partition function form game. This consistency allows us to model residual behaviour in a natural, intuitive way. Secondly, we consider a pair of solutions as the extrema of an interval for set inclusion. Taking the whole interval rather than just one of the extremes enables us to include or exclude outcomes with certainty.
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Paper provided by Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization in its series Research Memoranda with number
031.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Richter, Donald K, 1974.
"The Core of a Public Goods Economy,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 15(1), pages 131-42, February.
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