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Inefficiency of equilibria in query auctions with continuous valuations Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Grigorieva, Elena
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
Müller, Rudolf
Vermeulen, Dries (METEOR)
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We show that, when bidders have continuous valuations, any ex post equilibrium in an ex post individually rational query auction can only be ex post efficient when the running timeof the auction is infinite for almost all realizations of valuations of the bidders. We also show that this result applies to the general class of bisection auctions. In contrast we show that, when we allow for inefficient allocations with arbitrarily small probability, there is a query auction (to be more specific, a bisection auction) that attains this level of approximate efficiency in equilibrium, while additionally the running time of the auction in equilibrium is finite for all realizations of valuations.
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Paper provided by Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization in its series Research Memoranda with number
017.
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Date of creation: 2006Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dgr:umamet:2006017Contact details of provider: Web page: http://edocs.ub.unimaas.nl/
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references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian, 2006.
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Leufkens, Kasper & Peeters, Ronald & Vorsatz, Marc, 2006.
"Sequential auctions with synergies: An experimental analysis ,"
Research Memoranda
040, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
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