The effect of replacing an agent in a two-person two-state finance economy by a more risk averse agent is studied. It is established under which conditions the other agent benefitsor looses in equilibrium from dealing with a more risk averse agent. If one agent becomes more risk averse, then the equilibrium allocation moves towards that agent''s certainty line. Whether or not that is beneficial for the other agent, depends on the location of the endowment point.
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Paper provided by Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization in its series Research Memoranda with number
011.
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