On the effect of risk aversion in bimatrix games
AbstractNash equilibria with identical supports are compared for bimatrix games that are different with respect to the risk aversion of player 2. For equilibria in 2 by 2-bimatrix games and for equilibria with efficient supports in coordination games it is established for which cases increased risk aversion of player 2 benefits or hurts player 2.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization in its series Research Memoranda with number 029.
Date of creation: 2005
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