This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Monotonicity and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Contracts

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Haake,Claus-Jochen
Klaus,Bettina (METEOR)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We consider general two-sided matching markets, so-called matching with contracts markets as introduced by Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), and analyze (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable solutions. We show that for matching with contracts markets the stable correspondence is monotonic and implementable (Theorems 1 and 3). Furthermore, any solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and monotonic is a supersolution of the stable correspondence (Theore m 2). In other words, the stable correspondence is the minimal solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and implementable.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://edocs.ub.unimaas.nl/loader/file.asp?id=1082
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization in its series Research Memoranda with number 028.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dgr:umamet:2005028

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://edocs.ub.unimaas.nl/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Willy Villevoye).

Related research
Keywords: microeconomics ;

Other versions of this item:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Haake,Claus-Jochen & Klaus,Bettina, 2005. "Monotonicity and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Contracts," Research Memoranda 028, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Sonmez, Tayfun, 1996. "Implementation in generalized matching problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 429-439. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus & Markus Walzl, 2007. "Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts," Harvard Business School Working Papers 09-046, Harvard Business School, revised Sep 2008. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Alkan, Ahmet & Gale, David, 2003. "Stable schedule matching under revealed preference," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 289-306, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Paul R. Milgrom, 1985. "Auction Theory," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 779, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  7. John W. Hatfield & Paul Milgrom, 2005. "Auctions, Matching and the Law of Aggregate Demand," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000780, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Echenique, Federico & Oviedo, Jorge, 2006. "A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets," Theoretical Economics, Society for Economic Theory, vol. 1(2), pages 233-273, June. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Roth, Alvin E., 1985. "The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 277-288, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Roth, Alvin E, 1991. "A Natural Experiment in the Organization of Entry-Level Labor Markets: Regional Markets for New Physicians and Surgeons in the United Kingdom," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 415-40, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1990. "Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1083-99, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. John William Hatfield & Paul R. Milgrom, 2005. "Matching with Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 913-935, September. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Ehlers, Lars, 2004. "Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(2), pages 358-369, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Yamato, Takehiko, 1992. "On nash implementation of social choice correspondences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 484-492, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 47-57, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Maskin, Eric, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  17. William Thomson, 1999. "Monotonic extensions on economic domains," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 13-33. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  18. Kara, Tarik & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1996. "Nash Implementation of Matching Rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 425-439, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Tayfun Sönmez & Tarik Kara, 1997. "Implementation of college admission rules (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 197-218.
  20. Eric Maskin & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Economics Working Papers 0006, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  21. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  22. Roth, Alvin E & Xing, Xiaolin, 1994. "Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 992-1044, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 991-1016, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Kelso, Alexander S, Jr & Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1483-1504, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  25. Hurwicz, Leonid & Schmeidler, David, 1978. "Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1447-74, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Claus-Jochen Haake & Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus, 2008. "Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples," Harvard Business School Working Papers 09-017, Harvard Business School. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Claus-Jochen Haake & Bettina Klaus, 2009. "Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 393-410, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2006. "Farsightedly Stable Networks," Research Memoranda 041, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Apart from a small start up grant in the 1990's, RePEc has received no funding and lives on the help of volunteers.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-18.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.