Equilibrium plans in constrained environments
AbstractIn this paper we analyze equilibria in competitive environments under constraints across players'' strategies. This means that the action taken by one player limits the possible choices of the other players. In this context the classical approach, Kakutani''s Fixed Point theorem, does not work. In particular, best replies against a given strategy profile may not be feasible. We extend Kakutani''s Fixed Point theorem to deal with the feasibility issue.Our main motivation to study this problem of co-dependency comes from the field of supply chain planning. A set of buyers is faced with external demand over a planning horizon, and to satisfy this demand they request inputs from a set of suppliers. Both suppliers and buyers face production capacities and the planning is made in a decentralized manner. A well-known coordination scheme for this setting is the upstream approach where the planning of the buyers is used to decide the request to the suppliers. We show the existence of equilibria for two versions of this coordination model. However, we illustrate with an example that the centralized solution is not, in general, an equilibrium, suggesting that regulation may be needed.We also apply our Fixed Point theorem to a production economy, where both supply and demand are upper bounded.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization in its series Research Memoranda with number 001.
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/web/UMPublications.htm
operations research and management science;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-02-06 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Alejandro Saporiti & Fernando Tohmé, 2006.
"Single-Crossing, Strategic Voting and the Median Choice Rule,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 363-383, April.
- Alejandro Saporiti & Fernando Tohmé, 2003. "Single-Crossing, Strategic Voting and the Median Choice Rule," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 237, Universidad del CEMA.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Charles Bollen).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.