This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Dominant Strategy Mechanisms with Multidimensional Types

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Gui,Hongwei
Müller,Rudolf
Vohra,Rakesh (METEOR)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper provides a characterization of dominant strategy mechanisms with quasi-linear utilities and multi-dimensional types for a variety of preference domains. These characterizations are in terms of a monotonicity property on the underlying allocation rule.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://edocs.ub.unimaas.nl/loader/file.asp?id=961
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization in its series Research Memoranda with number 047.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dgr:umamet:2004047

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://edocs.ub.unimaas.nl/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Willy Villevoye).

Related research
Keywords: operations research and management science;

Other versions of this item:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 1998. "Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations," Discussion Papers 1244, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Sushil Bikhchandani & Shurojit Chatterjee & Arunava Sen, 2004. "Incentive Compatibility in Multi-unit Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000750, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Vijay Krishna & Motty Perry, 1997. "Efficient Mechanism Design," Game Theory and Information 9703010, EconWPA, revised 28 Apr 1998. [Downloadable!]
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Peters, Hans & Vermeulen, Dries, 2006. "WPO, COV and IIA bargaining solutions," Research Memoranda 021, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  2. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2005. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 142, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Ron Lavi & Ahuva Mu’alem & Noam Nisan, 2009. "Two simplified proofs for Roberts’ theorem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 407-423, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Müller, Rudolf & Uetz, Marc & Vohra, Rakesh & Heydenreich, Birgit, 2007. "Characterization of Revenue Equivalence," Research Memoranda 017, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Heydenreich,Birgit & Müller,Rudolf & Uetz,Marc, 2005. "Mechanisms for Decentralized Online Scheduling," Research Memoranda 021, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  6. Müller,Rudolf & Perea,Andrés & Wolf,Sascha, 2005. "Weak Monotonicity and Bayes-Nash Incentive Compatibility," Research Memoranda 039, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Jehiel, Philippe & Meyer-Ter-Vehn, Moritz & Moldovanu, Benny, 2006. "Mixed Bundling Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 5566, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-Ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu, 2006. "Mixed Bundling Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001123, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu, 2006. "Mixed Bundling Auctions," Discussion Papers 141, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    • Jehiel, Philippe & Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz & Moldovanu, Benny, 2007. "Mixed bundling auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 494-512, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu, 2008. "Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 469-490, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS also indexes software components.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-18.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.