We develop a model that allows for a comparison of corporate leniency programs for cartel behavior as enacted e.g. in the USA and the EU. Although all programs are based on the idea that the ex ante expected fine can be increased by granting fine reductions for self-reporting firms, these programs differ considerably in how this basic idea is legally implemented. Differences include the fine reductions granted for first and second self-reporters, the role of the amount of evidence provided, and the impact of whether the case is already under investigation. We elaborate on the role of asymmetric information to derive the optimal degree of leniency, and we apply our findings to compare the programs in the US and the EU and to evaluate the modifications of the EU policy in 2002.
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Paper provided by Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization in its series Research Memoranda with number
039.
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